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New ideas of socialism 
Abstract 
This paper discusses attempts to rethink socialism in the light of recent economic, 
social and political developments such as the rise of neo-liberalism, post-fordism, 
the demise of state socialism and globalization. 
It posits four new revisionist models of socialism - individualist socialism, 
market socialism, citizenship (or radical democratic) socialism and associational 
socialism. 
It examines each critically, arguing against the first and second models and in 
favour of the third and fourth. Associationalism, it is argued, provides a means for 
achieving the goals of citizenship or radical democratic socialism - a participatory 
pluralist and communitarian socialism. 
Associationalism, based on a strong role for associations in civil society and a 
co-operative polity, is outlined and advocated. 
There have been four significant developments affecting traditional concep-
tions of socialism in recent years - the increasing influence of neo-liberalism 
in the corridors of political power in a number of countries; the 'post-fordist' 
diversification of economic and social structures; the collapse of state 
socialism, East and West; and the globalization of economic, political and 
cultural life. These have undermined (although by no means displaced) the 
nation-state and the politics of mass production and consumption and class. 
They have exposed the redundancy of traditional socialist ideas about the 
imposition of socialism through the state, central planning and bureaucratic 
collective provision, whether done in the names of Keynes and Beveridge or 
of Marx and Lenin. In short they all scold socialism for its statism and they 
point to non-statist alternatives. 
Neo-liberalism, post-fordism, post-communism and globalization have 
emphasized new roles for non-statist ideas and institutions. They have 
emphasized a lesser role for the over-powerful central state, a greater role for 
freedom and diversity, for the market and an increasing emphasis on the 
importance of democracy. 
For some time socialists have been outflanked and left standing by such 
developments. The Left continued to follow statist and class-centred modes 
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of thinking in the West, while the state socialist governments in the East 
seemed oblivious to the moral and practical deficit in their systems of in-
efficient and oppressive rule from the centre. 
However socialists have finally been forced to adopt the anti-statist agenda. 
One reason for this is that recent anti-statist ideas have connected with a real 
popular dissatisfaction with the experience of statism and have made statism 
an electoral liability. Another less expedient reason is that nonstatist critiques 
and alternatives have exposed a genuine weakness in socialist thought and 
practice. State socialism, East and West, really has left a lot to be desired. At 
the least it has been unresponsive to public needs and inefficient in providing 
for them. At the worst it has been authoritarian, brutal and repressive. 
Why, then, the continuing pre-occupation with socialism that the tide of this 
piece implies? Socialism has a necessary role to play. The failings of 
socialism have been in its methods (state ownership and central planning, for 
instance) rather than in its ends (equality, co-operation and internationalism, 
for example) and once the statist means of socialism are got rid of, there is a 
lot left that is indispensable. In fact the ends of socialism remain more or less 
unscathed, if not more pressing than ever. 
Socialism has two contributions to make amidst the present ascendancy of 
pluralism and liberalism. First, there are a number of aims and insights in 
socialist thought which pluralism and liberalism do not have the conceptual 
apparatuses to deal with. There are specifically socialist principles which are 
important but lacking from these other doctrines. Secondly, the achievement 
of pluralist and liberal objectives is dependent upon certain socialist and col-
lectivist conditions. Without such conditions liberalism and pluralism will be 
their own downfall. Values and structures of mutual regard, universalism, co-
operation and equality are necessary for a liberal and pluralist society, yet not 
conceivable within an exclusively liberal or pluralist perspective. 
Furthermore in a context of nationalism and conflict, dangerous arms 
stocks, third world starvation and death and ecological crisis, nothing could be 
more in need than a doctrine which stresses equality, co-operation, inter-
nationalism and the public good. 
Let me look now at some of the ways that socialists have attempted to 
escape from old statist forms to new forms of democratic, pluralist and liber-
tarian socialist thinking. There are four redefinitions of traditional socialism 
that I wish to discuss - individualist socialism, market socialism, citizenship or 
radical democratic socialism and associational socialism. 
Individualist socialism 
The attempt to outdo neo-liberals on the issue of individual liberty has been 
the concern of some prominent British Labour Party politicians like Roy 
---- 
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Hattersley and Bryan Gould, as well as of academics such as Raymond Plant. 
2 
What is individualist socialism? 
The argument of these writers is that the traditional concern of socialism -
equality -, given a central place most seminally by writers like R. H. Tawney 
and C. A. R. Crosland,3 is a means of achieving what should be the central 
objective of socialists - individual liberty. Equality itself is not the end, but 
merely a stepping stone along the road to achieving liberty, the true goal of 
socialism. 
The liberal theory of liberty is a negative one which sees liberty as the 
absence of external coercion. The role of the state is to provide the conditions 
for minimizing coercion, not to impose an externally defined social good on 
individuals. Socialists, like Hattersley and Plant, go this far but go one step 
further. They argue also for a positive concept of liberty. That everyone might 
have negative liberty - freedom from external coercion - does not mean that 
they all have the resources and capacities to express or realize their freedom in 
their actions. They may not be able to pursue their intentions freely for lack of 
the relevant enabling assets. Thus an absence of the resources necessary to act 
freely is itself a restriction on liberty. In particular an inegalitarian distribution 
of those resources means that some will have a greater capacity to act freely 
than others. A condition, therefore, for positive liberty is that resources should 
be distributed equally so that liberty may be so distributed also. For the 
socialist libertarians, neo-liberalism fails to theorize the bases for the 
realization of positive liberty and for its egalitarian distribution. But because 
their positive theory does take these factors into account, socialists believe 
that their perspective is better at individual libertarianism than neo-liberalism 
itself. 
In my opinion, the socialist argument, put by people like Hattersley and 
Plant, reduces the liberal theory of freedom to rubble. However while 
Hattersley and Plant make a good critique of the liberal theory of liberty and 
propose a good alternative, their theory is not a sufficient basis for a redefined 
socialism. It is a good socialist theory of liberty, but is flawed as a libertarian 
theory of socialism. 
There are two main reasons for this, noted by Barry Hindess4 in his critique 
of the individualist socialists - one to do with the libertarianism of this 
approach and the other to do with its individualism. Let me briefly run 
through some of the main aspects of these two problems. 
One problem is the undifferentiated priority the individualist redefinition of 
socialism gives to liberty. There are many freedoms some of which can only 
be  
 New ideas of socialism 155 
protected at the expense of others, some of which are more important, and 
whose hierarchy of importance will vary from time to time and place to place. 
The undifferentiated idea of individual liberty gives us no way of dealing with 
this. The idea that individual liberty is the priority cannot deal with the fact 
that there are a large number of liberties amongst which we have to make 
distinctions and preferences. The individual liberty redefinition gives the 
impression that a blow for one freedom is a blow for freedom as a whole. 
Furthermore it is highly problematic to make a single principle the defining 
feature of a political doctrine, be that principle liberty or any other. There are 
many other objectives important to a humane organization of human life, the 
pre-determined exclusive prioritization of anyone of which will lead to the 
exclusion of others. This sort of reductionism allows the one superior 
principle to walk all over a wide range of other important values and needs in 
society. The ethical basis of any ideology needs to be more pluralist and 
eclectic than this if it is to face up to the complexity of modem society. 
Defining socialism as the pursuit of individual liberty commits socialists to 
defending this principle when it is threatened by other values and priorities, 
such as the pursuit of equality, social co-operation or justice. There is 
sometimes a tension between different values - equality and liberty do 
sometimes threaten each other - and on such occasions choices have to be 
made guided by a greater open-mindedness and eclecticism of thought rather 
than by an a priori and automatic commitment to one value over another. 
Individual liberty is not always the most desirable priority in every situation. 
Sometimes it needs to be restricted in pursuit of another important value. 
For instance, it is very difficult to justify the continued freedom of 
motorists to clog up the atmosphere and jam the roads at great environmental, 
social and economic cost in the name of their freedom to do so. People are 
free to move about by whatever means they choose. But in certain situations 
their freedom to do so needs to be overridden in preference for other priorities 
which take on a greater significance - environmental considerations or its 
consequences for the public good, for instance. Defining the doctrine of 
socialism as the pursuit of individual liberty does not allow socialists to 
subordinate individual liberty every so often to such other priorities. You 
cannot reduce socialism to individual liberty. There are other objectives which 
socialists must have which are excluded by a theory of socialism as a belief in 
individual liberty and which will sometimes involve overriding this objective. 
The second main problem with the attempt to redefine socialism as the 
pursuit of individual liberty is the individualism of this approach. The 
commitment to individual liberty is a nominally formal one which resists, in 
the name of the freedom of individuals from externally defined priorities, 
even the most good-hearted attempts to impose a preferred shape on society. 
Given the record of socialism on this score this is a fairly understandable bias. 
But the problem is that it invalidates any attempt to establish a social good 
over and above what individuals desire. It intentionally avoids substantive 
commitments about what society should be like, other than that there should 
be an 
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equal distribution of freedom for people to determine for themselves their 
own good life. 
This all sounds very nice until you realize that what it does, in effect, is to 
let in just another particular substantive vision of society as consisting of the 
sum total of individuals' preferences, over which individuals have no overall 
control. In this sense individualism is, in fact, a highly substantive doctrine -
one which posits a competitive individualist society immune to overall 
democratic direction - and it should not be mistaken for an impartial 
libertarian or democratic alternative to the authoritarian ascriptions of public 
good doctrines. 
Society necessarily always takes a substantive form. The doctrine of 
individual liberty which is nominally agnostic effectively does have 
substantive implications. The unintended effect of the individual liberty 
redefinition of socialism is to allow an individualistic and competitive 
society, of the sort that should be anathema to socialists, to slip in through the 
back door disguised as mere formalism. By retreating from a substantive 
theory of the sort of society desired, in preference for the freedom of 
individuals to plan their own futures, it leaves the constitution of the shape of 
society to the competitive interaction of individuals. 
It cannot even be claimed, as neo-liberals like to, that the substantive 
outcome is random or arbitrary rather than the product of a particular view of 
society. This idea is undermined in reality by the disproportionate influence 
wielded by particularly powerful actors like big business in the competitive 
interactions of free market economies. 
An individual liberty redefinition of socialism puts above all else the idea 
that individuals' intentions or definitions of the good should be treated with 
equal validity and allowed to flower. The problem with this is that all courses 
of action are judged according to the liberty of individuals to be able to 
pursue them, and without regard for their consequences or for what is good 
above and beyond individuals' separate preferences. Public good judgments 
are seen as an imposition on the freedom of the individual. But the 
individualist alternative reduces socialism to a purely formal doctrine of 
individual freedom, without allowing it to say anything about the substantive 
desirability of the particular paths followed by individuals, which may be 
more or less desirable according to wider public or social considerations. A 
wider variety of substantive considerations needs to be brought in to evaluate 
the consequences of different expressions of individual freedom for other 
individuals or for public life. 
There is nothing paternalistic or authoritarian about arguing for more 
substantive ideas of what society should be like, or about arguing for a public 
good. Society necessarily takes a substantive form and not to make a choice 
about what this should be is as much to make a choice as is the conscious 
socialist attempt to pursue deliberate priorities. In other words, the apparently 
libertarian neo-liberal is as much assuming a particular substantive set of 
arrangements as is the socialist. If decisions are not made about the desirable 
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shape of society publicly by social interests as a whole then the shape of 
society will be moulded by a combination of laissez-faire and the influence of 
powerful interests. 
Furthermore a substantively committed perspective can formulate a model 
of social conditions actually facilitative of individual liberty and democracy. 
Competitive individualism is less a safe haven for liberal and pluralist 
objectives than a context of co-operation and co-ordination. Co-operative and 
co-ordinated social relations allow for the protection of diverse individualities 
by their integration into, rather than marginalization from, democratic 
structures in which they can stand their corner. Co-ordination can be used to 
protect and foster pluralism and liberty rather than leaving them to the free-
for-all of laissez-faire. This need not involve a paternalistic or authoritarian 
vision because individuals and social groups can be part of processes of 
democratic co-ordination. Desired prescriptions need not be imposed from 
above but can be determined through inclusive participatory democratic 
negotiation. 
Market socialism 
What is market socialism? 
There is much confusion on the left about the place of markets in socialist 
thinking. In my opinion the term 'market socialism' has been used far too 
broadly. It should be used to describe the idea of a market forces economy 
allegedly compatible with socialist values. But it should not be used to refer to 
conceptions of socialism in which markets are seen as having a role without 
being the dominant organizing principle in the economy. 
Much of what is normally called market socialism goes nowhere near 
advocacy of a market forces economy in which economic decision-making is 
dominated by market considerations. People traditionally written off as 
market socialists, Alec Nove for instance, are nothing of the sort.5 They do 
not advocate an economy dominated by market forces. What they advocate is 
an economy in which markets have a role but are not its defining feature. In 
fact the degree of central planning, regulation and social ownership proposed 
by people like Nove makes them traditionalists in many ways and not so far 
from socialist orthodoxy as many on the left would like to imagine. 
People who criticize this sort of thinking, which takes the role of markets 
seriously, are simply confusing the role, which more or less every socialist 
economist has quite happily conceded to markets, with market forces 
liberalism, which is quite another thing. 
Real market socialism, on the other hand, envisages an economy driven by 
market forces yet compatible with socialism. What market socialists like Saul 
Estrin and Julian Le Grand argue for are worker-controlled enterprises 
operating in a market forces economy, in other words for 'economic 
liberalism 
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without the capitalists', as Hirst puts it.6 They tend to argue that their position 
is socialist on the rather dubious grounds that the means of production are 
owned by workers. 
Market socialists, to their credit, do attempt to respond to some of the 
obvious deficiencies of traditional socialism - the over-centralization of state 
ownership and planning, their undemocratic inefficiency and lack of con-
sideration for the rights of the consumer and the individual. Market socialists 
combine a critique of these problems with a belief in the fact that markets are 
not the polar opposite of socialism, but are compatible with it. 
Markets, they argue, have distinct informational and motivational advan-
tages. If a good is in heavy demand its price will rise, acting as an indicator of 
its under-supply and an incentive, in the form of promised higher profits, for 
producers to respond with increased production. In the case of overproduction, 
prices fall giving producers the information and incentive to redirect 
production to other more profitable areas. In these ways markets provide fast 
and efficient methods of supplying information on consumer demand and a 
sure way of making certain that producers will respond. They encourage 
innovation and dynamism because producers have continually to improve 
their products and efficiency and discover new areas of demand in order to 
make a profit. Markets involve the distribution of purchasing power to 
consumers who are able to choose between products and dictate, through their 
purchasing behaviour, to producers what they should produce. 
All this overcomes the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of central state 
planning and it decentralizes power down to enterprises and individual 
consumers. In these ways it runs with neo-liberal, post-fordist and post-
communist trends, shifting from a statist model of socialism to a pluralist, 
liberal and individualist one. I do not wish to ditch the whole paraphernalia of 
the system just outlined. Although I think the role of market forces needs to be 
diluted by the inclusion of more social and non-market criteria in enterprise 
decision-making I do think market places and market forces have a role to 
play in any pluralist and socialist economy, precisely because they do serve 
the functions I have just outlined. But let me look now at problems with the 
market socialist model. 
What is wrong with market socialism and why it is not socialist: need, social objectives 
and equality 
 This raises the question of what remains socialist with such a model, and this is the critical question which has been levelled most frequently at the market 
socialists. 
Market socialists defend the socialist nature of their proposals on two 
grounds. First, while they are equivocal about end-state socialism, the idea 
that socialism should be committed to equal outcomes, they are firmly 
committed to starting-gate equality and they think that market forces are 
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compatible with this socialist principle. Secondly they argue that the 
distinction between socialism and capitalism has nothing to do with the role of 
markets but, rather, to do with ownership of the means of production. They 
argue that market socialism is socialist because the dominant form of 
ownership in it is workers' ownership, a non-capitalist and definitively 
socialist form. 
But their claims for the compatibility of the market economy and socialism 
simply do not stand up. Socialism should be defined by its ends not its 
means, and as social ownership is a means for achieving socialist goals and 
not an end in itself then it quite clearly cannot be seen as a factor defining 
socialism. Ownership of the means of production has always been a means to 
achieving socialist ends and not an end in itself. Hence it cannot be a defining 
feature of socialism. Therefore the market socialist defence of their position 
as socialist because it posits non-capitalist forms of ownership simply does 
not stand up. 
But there are other reasons for rejecting market socialism's claims to there 
being a compatibility between a market forces economy and socialist values. 
There are three main socialist values which a market forces economy goes 
against - production for need, social objectives in decision-making, and 
equality. On all of these questions market socialism falls down. 
First, production for need. Market forces are a poor way of meeting social 
need because they respond not to need but to consumer demand, which is 
quite another thing. In the market forces model, demand is conflated with 
purchasing behaviour which is shaped by unequally distributed purchasing 
power, otherwise known as 'ability to pay'. Market forces will respond to high 
levels of demand, but demand is skewed as an indicator of need by peoples' 
differing abilities to pay. Producers in market economies will not respond to 
needs which do not get translated into purchasing behaviour because of lack of 
purchasing power or which get translated unevenly due to differences in 
purchasing power. In this sense markets are lacking severely in that which 
they claim as their main strength - responsiveness to the needs of the 
consumer. 
This criticism does not imply simply the imposition of spuriously 'objective' 
and uniform needs on people regardless of their preferences. If the market 
cannot facilitate the free undistorted expression by individuals of their own 
needs this does not mean that their needs should be determined for them from 
above by the state. Needs can be defined democratically from below through 
the pluralist social negotiation of diverse interests. There is a need for the use 
of market criteria in enterprise decision-making, and consumer demand should 
be a factor taken into account in deciding on production priorities. However 
consumers also need to be empowered on the boards of enterprises and market 
research needs to be carried out in order to identify needs which are distorted 
or unrepresented in patterns of consumer market demand. Such mechanisms 
can be sensitive to the diversity of needs as they are defined by people 
themselves, resorting to neither the statist imposition of preferences nor the 
distorted perceptions of market forces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
160 Luke Martell 
Market socialists argue that the distorting effect that unequal distributions 
of purchasing power have on the accuracy with which market forces respond 
to need can be resolved by redistribution. The problem with this response is 
that it glosses over the question of how exactly such a huge redistributional 
task could be achieved and sustained within the context of a market economy 
whose dynamic is based on the reproduction and accumulation of inequalities. 
Socialists working within capitalist or market economies have always 
overestimated the extent to which it is possible politically to intervene and 
regulate an economy in the direction of policy objectives which are in direct 
contradiction to the logic of the economic system. 
A second problem with market socialism is that market forces foster 
competition at the expense of co-operation and a regard for 'externalities', 
social and environmental considerations which are not recorded on the 
balance sheet. Success or even viability on the market demands such a social 
myopia. Competitive success and profits always come first, even if there may 
be different ways of realizing them. 
Market socialists reply to this with the rather weak response that they reject 
the sort of communitarian alternative this criticism implies. This is a weak 
reply because, in true Hayekian fashion, it creates only one far-fetched 
communitarian alternative, a monolithic community in which all individuals 
deny their own individuality for the good of the community. This allows for 
only two extremely counterposed alternatives - market competition and 
monist communitarianism. This caricature may resemble the very real 
experience of Eastern European socialism. But greater co-operation and a 
regard for externalities need not require such a subordination of the plural to 
the social as was experienced in this particular case. 
Plural interests in society can have greater regard for other interests and the 
public good without denying their own individuality. It is perfectly feasible 
for individuals or groups to make compromises with the needs of other groups 
and the needs of society as a whole and yet still retain much of their 
individual identity and freedom. It is rather disengenuous to pretend 
otherwise. And the social good and wider social interests need not be an 
'objective', externally or state-defined thing, they can be negotiated and 
agreed by plural interests themselves in processes of associational 
negotiation. 
Market socialists try to pass off competition onto capitalism arguing that 
the existence of worker co-operatives in a market economy would foster more 
community, the idea being that workers would adopt a more co-operative 
outlook on life through being involved in co-operative production decision-
making. More likely, though, is that co-operatives in such a context would 
foster only an internal sense of community and would be just as subject to 
sectional self-interests and competitive considerations in external relation-
ships as capitalist enterprises are. There is no reason to suggest that 
solidaristic sentiments fostered within worker-controlled enterprises will be 
generalized into a broader solidarism unless there are comparable communal 
structures also linking enterprises with one another and the wider world. 
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Another market socialist answer to the 'competition' criticism is that a 
market economy is perfectly compatible with the existence of co-operative 
relationships beyond the marketized sector. How far this is actually empiri-
cally the case is debatable. Private self-interest is rife in non-market 
relationships in societies with market economies. Non-market relationships 
are played out frequently as if they have been commodified or marketized. For 
instance, economic self-interest, rather than social welfare, is the issue closest 
to peoples' hearts when they are in the polling booth. In addition consumerism 
and privatism are central features of family and household life. Even if this 
were not the case, though, or only the case to a limited extent, it would still 
leave an economy run according to the principle of competitive self-interest. 
The economy shapes people's lives to an unimaginable extent. Regardless of 
the degree of co-operative benevolence exhibited elsewhere in the social 
system, the exclusive sway of competitive self-interest in the economy is 
indictment enough. 
Market competition breeds successes and losers, high earners and low 
earners, prosperous and neglected regions. In short it breeds inequality. This is 
the third factor on which the socialist affectations of the workers' control 
marketeers collapse. Market socialists have a very equivocal attitude to the 
question of equality. On the one hand they reject inequality, attribute it to 
capitalism rather than markets and propose redistribution to overcome it. Yet 
on the other hand they accept and positively celebrate the inherently 
inegalitarian nature of market forces. 
Attempting to offload the blame for inequality on to capitalism is very 
misleading. Both capitalism and markets create and reproduce inequality. To 
point to capitalist inequality only distracts attention from the fact that markets 
are also inherently and cumulatively inegalitarian. 
Market socialists who accept the inegalitarianism of market forces argue on 
one hand that much inequality is not unjust and on the other that inequality in 
market economies can be rectified by redistributional measures. On the first 
point they reject end-state equality on the grounds that it smacks too much of 
monist communitarianism and because unequal outcomes are not unjust as 
long as people have all started out the same at the starting-gate. But more 
egalitarian and social considerations do not automatically imply some sort of 
monist communitarianism. Egalitarianism is compatible with pluralism. 
Equality is not the same as uniformity. Furthermore the commitment to 
starting-gate equality without end-state equality is very problematic. The 
problem is that what is inequality at the end of one process is inequality at the 
start of another. It is difficult to decide where a just distribution begins and 
where it ends. To put it another way, the unequal outcome which is acceptable 
to the market socialist will inevitably form an unequal starting point in another 
set of interactions which is not. The unequal end becomes illegitimate in 
market socialist starting-gate equality terms when it becomes an unequal start. 
When they do attempt to argue for redistribution market socialists grossly 
underestimate the extent to which equality can be legislated or regulated for 
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within a market context in which the economy is driven by a dynamic which 
inherently reproduces and accumulates inequalities. They also argue that the 
market is a lottery in which unequal outcomes, resulting from non-deserving 
factors, are likely to be balanced out by later unequal outcomes which favour 
those who were less lucky earlier on. But this does not stand up, because on the 
basis of an undeserved lucky outcome an actor is put into a privileged 
economic position which he/she can use to ensure an advantage in later 
transactions. 
One by-product of the inegalitarianism of market forces lies in the fact that 
inequality subverts positive liberty, the extent to which people have the 
capacities, resources and abilities to express themselves freely. If a more equal 
distribution of resources, enabling people to realize their capacity for liberty, is 
achieved then this has to be something which would give joy to any genuine 
libertarian as well as to egalitarians because it will have increased the 
possibilities for liberty to flower in the world as well as increasing the amount 
of equality in the distribution of liberty. A more egalitarian distribution of the 
resources needed to ensure the positive expression of liberty generalizes the 
extent of liberty as well as equalizing it. Equality is a basis for an increase in 
the sum of liberty as well as in its equal distribution. Again, then, on a question 
on which market socialists claim particular superiority over traditional 
socialism, that of liberty, they are distinctly lacking in credibility because their 
preferred system fosters an inegalitarianism which undermines positive liberty. 
Democracy, citizenship and socialism 
What is citizenship socialism? 
 
The third new form of socialist thinking which has attempted to respond to 
neo-liberalism, post-fordism and post-communism has accepted many of the 
problems with traditional socialism raised by these three influences but has 
tried to go beyond individualist or market alternatives. This third new idea of 
socialism - 'citizenship' or 'radical democratic' socialism - has attempted to 
retain the collectivist and social commitments of socialism but to replace the 
statist forms they have so far tended to take with more democratic forms. It 
proposes a non-statist alternative, but one that resorts to the democratization 
of the public good rather than its replacement by neo-liberal private 
instrumentalism and market anarchy. Democratization has been a way of 
restructuring socialism to make it more appealing and adequate, and has even 
for many become the very substance of socialism, such that, for many now, 
socialism is democratization. 
Some socialist democratic theorists, Norberto Bobbio for instance, call for 
socialism to accommodate itself to liberal democratic ideas and institutions 
such as parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.7 The basic institutions 
of liberal democracy, which in places like Britain are in need of radical 
reform, 
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have for too long been dismissed by socialists as mere 'bourgeois democracy' 
and are now widely accepted by most on the Left and so beyond question, in 
terms at least of their basic initial desirability, that they need no further 
justification. 
What I wish to concentrate on are new theories committed to the 
democratization of socialism through new forms of decentralization, citizen-
ship and participation which go beyond conventional liberal democracy. I 
focus on these because they propose more than an accommodation with 
already existing liberal democratic forms, important as this is. They propose a 
place for forms of democracy which, while with theoretical and even practical 
precedent, have been more or less absent from post-war capitalist and socialist 
societies and are not taken that seriously in mainstream practical political 
thinking. These latter theories propose a challenge not just to socialism, but 
also to liberal democracy. Writers like Bowles and Gintis, Dahl, Held, Hirst, 
Keane, Laclau and Mouffe, Plant, Rustin and Walzer argue for a wide variety 
of steps ranging from the acceptance of traditional Western liberal democratic 
institutions, to their radical constitutional reform, to the extension of 
democracy from the polity into the economy and civil society, through to new 
radical pluralist, decentralized and participatory forms of democracy. 
The right-wing neo-liberal response to the increasingly intrusive role of the 
state, East and West, into peoples' lives in civil society is to abandon ideas of 
the common good and collectivism and to roll back the state to the most 
minimal forms possible. In its place neo-liberals put the individual and the 
pursuit of private self-interest as the governing principles of economic and 
political organization. Some of the democratic thinkers above, John Keane for 
instance, are partly sympathetic to some of these liberal ideas. However the 
dominant citizenship socialist response to statism is not to abandon public 
needs and provision in favour of privatization and markets but to bring them 
under greater democratic control. Democracy as such is seen as 'socialism's 
best answer to the right'.9 The citizenship socialists are more concerned with 
democratizing the state and decentralizing state powers into civil society than 
they are with separating off the state from civil society and minimizing its 
role. 
The new citizenship socialists' arguments, succinctly summarized in New 
Statesman articles by Chantal Mouffe and Michael Walzer,10 call for a 
greater role for active citizens participating fully and equally in politics to 
determine the common good. This relies on a version of the positive liberty 
theory. All citizens should be entitled to an active and equal part in the 
political governance of their society and should have the citizenship rights and 
the resources to make this possible. In this sense the new citizenship socialism 
it is very much an egalitarian doctrine. It is also deeply social and 
participatory. It depends heavily on the generalization of a sense of 'civic 
virtue' in society, a culture of commitment to public affairs and political 
activity. 
 - -  
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There are four problems that plague the new citizenship socialism - first, it is 
difficult to see how the citizenship idea of individual participation is feasible 
in mass complex societies; second, it is difficult to see how mass participation 
can be compatible with the dominance of representative democracy in such 
societies; thirdly, the idea of the common will proposed by some citizenship 
democrats is potentially a dangerously unpluralist idea; and, fourthly, the 
citizenship democratic proposals are sometimes still fairly abstract, lacking 
ideas about the political institutions which could turn them into reality. 
1) Participatory democracy. One of the problems with citizenship 
democracy is that it is not clear how the sort of mass participatory democracy 
it implies is possible in huge and complex advanced industrial societies. 
Democratic decision-making would have to occur in huge forums in which 
people could not possibly participate adequately and in which decision-
making would be dominated by small groups and driven by passion and 
intimidation rather than by reason and compromise. Many decisions would 
have to be made on complex and specialized matters about which most people 
would be insufficiently knowledgeable to make informed decisions. 
2) Representative democracy. It is also not clear what the role of 
representative democracy, the dominant political institution in many of the 
advanced industrialized societies, is in all this. Representative democracy 
would seem, on the face of it, to be anathema to the participatory ideas of the 
citizenship democrats as it involves decisions being made by a rather 
exclusive club. In a representative democracy the political participation of the 
individual is, in the very nature of the system, restricted. The essence of 
representative democracy is that authority is given to a party to rule, and to the 
people to remove it. What is not involved is rule by the people themselves. 
Representative democracy is a response to the demands of mass society and 
citizenship democracy has to come to terms with how active participation is to 
work in the context of representative structures which are not conducive to 
widespread active citizenship. 
3) The common will. Another problem is that citizenship democracy has to 
shed or reformulate its commitment to a common will. In large complex 
societies, run through with plural divisions, differences and fractures, it is 
impossible to conceive of the possibility of a common will, arising spon-
taneously from the people as a whole and shared by them all. The idea of the 
general will arose in pre-modern times in the face of absolutism and before the 
days of mass nation-states when small republics or city-states could make 
some claim to an internal homogeneity, although even in these cases such a 
claim was rather dubious and based on the exclusion of large sections of the 
population from citizenship. Modem societies are just too complex and 
pluralist to sustain a common will. The idea of a general will more often than 
not means majoritarian democracy and the suppression of minority interests 
and needs. The general will is more often than not a mythical construct, an 
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imaginary community, which is insensitive to, and suppresses, real diversity 
and pluralism. The idea of the peoples' will has been most notoriously 
invoked by fascism and state socialism. In both cases horrific deeds have 
been carried out in its name and dissidence brutally suppressed in order to 
sustain the myth. But where there is pluralism, as there always is, even in the 
small republic and the city-state, democratic structures are needed which do 
not suppose a common homogeneity but which place liberal checks on the 
power of democracy in the hands of a majority and make democracy 
responsive to pluralism and diversity. 
Large complex societies are governed according to the principle of 
minimal political participation, the representation of difference in multiple 
parties and the accountability of government to the people rather than its 
conflation with them. Citizenship democrats have to work out a way of 
formulating the idea of active citizenship so that it is not geared towards the 
idea of a general will, but towards a conception of complex plural interests 
amongst whom shared compromises can be negotiated. Pluralism does not 
rule out the possibility of agreed overall social priorities, but it does rule out 
the idea of a single will of society. 
4) Political institutions. The question that arises from these observations is 
what are the political institutions appropriate for a participatory citizenship 
democracy? If existing representative institutions are not up to making space 
for greater participation, then what institutions are? Some of the citizenship 
socialists support the British Charter 88 campaign for proportional represen-
tation, a bill of rights, a written constitution, devolution and such like. But 
while these are important and worthy proposals they do not really connect 
with, or help to concretize, ideas of active citizenship and participation. They 
are more oriented towards individual citizenship rights, than towards active 
participation, the common will or civic duty. Charter 88 is concerned with the 
reform of existing liberal-democratic political institutions. It does not attempt 
to break out of the liberal democratic paradigm or address the limitations of 
representation as such, or the institutional forms appropriate to an alternative 
participatory model of democracy. 
On the whole the citizenship theorists are working on a fairly abstract level 
and their answers to questions about concrete institutional arrangements are 
vague. Their abstract calls for a citizenship democracy are aimed largely at 
maintaining the credibility of collectivism by arguing for a shift from statism 
to democratization rather than to the market or privatization. This is a worthy 
project but it has yet to broach some of the concrete proposals required of it. It 
is understandable that at this stage the way forward has had to be mainly in 
sketching some outline theoretical bases for further development. Many of the 
citizenship devotees are attempting to rescue concepts from republican 
traditions of political thought in order to find a language for their new 
approach. However it is also understandable that critics like Alec Nove and 
David Miller see, with some justification, concepts like 'democratic collectiv-
ism' as no more than slogans. 12 
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Citizenship socialism and associational democracy 
 
There are two ways in which associational democracy can provide the 
institutions appropriate to the participatory communitarian democracy envis-
aged by the citizenship socialists. First, associations can provide forums for 
the active popular participation of individuals in politics at accessible 
decentralised levels. Second, corporatist concertation between associations 
can provide a mechanism through which interest groups can participate in 
government and pluralistically negotiate a 'common good', co-operation be 
fostered amongst them and pluralist, inclusive and non-statist forms of 
planning and co-ordination be enabled. These are the two prongs of 
associationalism - a strong role for voluntary associations in a pluralist civil 
society and an inclusive corporatist polity comprised of associations rep-
resenting the plurality of interests in society negotiating agreed social 
priorities.13 Let me discuss these points in more detail. 
One possible answer to the question of the institutions appropriate to a 
more participatory democracy might be greater decentralization - functional 
or territorial. Functional decentralization can take place through the de-
volution of decision-making over particular functions - certain industries or 
the arts or higher education - to bodies specifically responsible for those 
functions. I mention the arts and higher education as examples because these 
are areas in which there already is some functional decentralization of powers 
in many countries. Territorially decentralization could be down to regional or 
local government. Decentralization can bring democracy down to more small-
scale and local levels at which citizens can participate more fully and with a 
greater knowledge of the affairs being discussed. Assuming that participation 
is desirable it will be necessary to come up with concrete suggestions about 
forums in which it is possible, particularly given that in large-scale complex 
societies the idea of mass participatory democracy and active citizenship 
seems, on the face of it, to be problematic. 
A key problem with decentralization concerns the question of how 
decentralized units can be integrated into mutualist relations to prevent a 
decline into particularism and instrumental group self-interest and ensure 
economic efficiency and viability. Larger scale co-ordination might necessi-
tate a continuing role for representative democracy. But I would argue also for 
corporatist arrangements in which decentralized units can negotiate co-
ordinated strategies and co-operative relationships amongst themselves rather 
than deferring such matters to an external and exclusive representative body. 
Another problem raised by the idea of citizenship democracy is that it is 
predominantly individualistic in its understanding of agency even though it is 
strongly oriented around the negotiation of a common good. The problem 
with individual participation is that individuals themselves can have only an 
extremely limited input into decision-making, whether in representative or 
participatory democracies. It is only where participatory democracy takes 
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place in very small-scale contexts that individual participation is possible on a 
meaningful scale. 
The way to overcome this problem and give individuals an influence is 
through their organization into shared interest associations. Such associations 
can be given a formal institutionalized role in corporatist political forums. 
This should not replace multi-party representative democracy but sup-
plement it. For all its faults representative democracy does ensure some sort of 
accountability of governments to the electorate that puts a restraint on 
dictatorial behaviour. Representative democracy is a necessity in a mass 
society in which possibilities for participation will inevitably be limited yet in 
which some form is needed to check the power of government and make it 
accountable. Nevertheless, for all the virtues of such a system, this is no 
justification for an exclusively representative democracy devoid of associ-
ational or participatory forms. 
Associationalism permits individuals who are not interested in political 
activity to wield an influence through collective associations. Furthermore it 
provides for more functionally decentralized forums whose scale is more 
amenable to active citizenship and to the participation of those who do wish to 
participate. The negotiation of the common good by associations would rid us 
of the idea that there is a uniform will spontaneously existing amongst us all or 
expressed in some agency outside and above us, be it a spiritual deity or a 
political administration. The common good in an associationalist context, 
hammered out by negotiation, would not be one shared by all, nor one that was 
pre-existing and objective. It would be one that would be reached through 
compromises between interests in negotiation and resulting from inter-
subjective relations, rather than from an objective will. On the other hand it 
also involves, against liberal individualism, a commitment to an overall public 
or social good. 
Another advantage of a more associationalist form of democracy is that it 
provides channels - associations and corporatist structures - through which 
interests can continue to exert an influence on governments between elections. 
Under representative democracy it is possible for governments to push through 
legislation against the tide of public opinion without suffering adverse 
electoral consequences. Representative democracy does not mean that policy-
making is going to be sensitive to the great diversity of needs in society 
between elections. In Britain Mrs Thatcher deliberately decided in her period 
in power to override the power of plural interests, in a conception of 
parliamentary sovereignty which stressed the mandate of election and saw the 
influence of plural interests in between elections as an interference with 
democracy. 
What pluralist pressure there is on governments between elections needs to 
be expanded and formalized. Party government can be made more responsive 
to plural needs between elections by the building into representative 
government of structures of corporatist negotiation. This can be done through 
the organized consultation of governments with interests in society and 
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additionally by second Houses of Interests at national, regional and local 
levels which would not have powers superior to those of first chambers but 
could throw out legislation from them, force them to consider legislation and 
act generally as the conscience of a pluralist society in between elections. 
Community, pluralism and associationalism 
. 
Before concluding let me say a few more words about both the meaning of 
associationalism and its relationship to socialism. These two questions can be 
clarified by a brief discussion of the way in which associationalism lies at the 
intersection of, and attempts to combine, the usually opposed principles of 
community and pluralism.14 
1 have already said that the two key features defining associationalism are, 
first, a strong role for voluntary associations in a decentralist civil society and, 
second, mutualist social negotiations between plural associations in an 
inclusive corporatist state. 
An associationalist politics might be similar to that pursued by radical left-
wing local authorities in Britain in the 1980s. These authorities fostered an 
associational culture in civil society through funding and consultation 
activities. They attempted to build co-operative relations between associations 
and incorporate them into political life through pseudo-corporatist structures 
of consultation and co-option on to council committees. There were many 
problems with 'local socialist' strategies. They were often aimed at mobilizing 
support rather then devolving power. They were politically selective in the 
groups they chose to empower. And their pluralist associationalism was often 
compromised by a contradictory commitment to a hegemonic politics of 
confrontational vanguardist leadership. But some of the political directions 
associationalism could take can be seen in their political approach. 15 
The two-pronged conception outlined above combines the two too 
frequently counterposed political ideologies of pluralism and socialism. It 
provides for a pluralist rather than a statist or too constraining collectivist 
socialism. Yet it also provides on the other hand for a mutualist and co-
operative pluralism rather than one which reacts so far to statist 
communitarianism that it slides into an unfettered competitive asociality. 
Thus associationalism is defined by its combining of pluralism with a co-
operative mutualism. The socialism it relates to is one firmly within the 
pluralist yet co-operative tradition of the doctrine. It provides an alternative to 
the two major state-centered and over-collectivist traditions which have 
dominated the history of twentieth-century socialist thought and politics -
Western social democracy and Eastern bloc marxist-leninism. 
One way of understanding the form of socialism associationalism relates to 
is to look at the inter-war domination of socialist thought and politics by the 
rise of bolshevism in the Soviet Union and Fabian socialism in Britain. 
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Associational socialism corresponds more closely to the tradition advocated 
by G. D. H. Cole and the guild socialists in that period yet marginalized by the 
dominance of the other two traditions. 16 
It should be noted, incidentally, that socialism is defined here according to 
values - co-operation and pluralism - and not techniques - central planning or 
social ownership, for instance. Techniques are means to an end and not the 
end itself. To identify a doctrine with philosophical objectives with the 
technical means of achieving them is highly problematic. 
What is needed is a co-operative model of social and political organization 
which offers a pluralistic and democratic alternative to state communi-
tarianism. Yet to retain the co-operative values of socialism it must avoid a 
slide into the selfish rationality and inegalitarian exploitation of liberal 
individualism and competitive pluralism. A model is required which combines 
pluralism and socialism. 
Mutualism has to be preserved without monism and pluralism without 
particularism. But how do you foster liberty and diversity without their 
escalation into parochial self-interest, antagonism and the infringement of the 
liberty of others? How do you enforce social responsibility and create 
democratic power without transgressing autonomy or facilitating dangerous 
accumulations of power? 
The answer lies in a third approach, neither statist nor laissez-faire, nor one 
that attempts to conflate or escape from the state or market. The third 
approach has to be one that manages a reconciliation between these enduring 
traditional polar opposites, finding a way of combining them and making them 
live together rather than against one another.17 
The concepts of ' pluralist social negotiation' and 'associational democracy' 
offer tools for thinking through a co-operative pluralist third way. There 
should be a pluralist society with the maximum possible degree of decentral-
ized freedom and without restrictions on diversity. But this should not be 
allowed to collapse into an atomistic and uncoordinated competitive sec-
tionalism. Plural and free individuals and groups should pursue their own 
independent identities and interests in a spirit of social responsibility and 
mutual regard. While I want to preserve pluralism I want to do so within a 
social context. 
The way to do this is to stand by the idea of autonomous and diverse 
individuals and interests in society but to integrate them into systems of 
association and pluralist social negotiation within which they must pursue 
their own identities and interests in negotiation with others and with a regard 
for others' priorities. 
Associational democracy describes a political structure and system of 
relations intended to facilitate the pluralist social negotiation of social 
priorities. Pluralist social negotiation describes the process appropriate to that 
structure and set of relations. The process is one in which social priorities are 
negotiated by independent interests interacting in inclusive political structures. 
These are associational in the sense that the key actors are associations 
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representing different interests and in that they are combined in associative 
rather than either opposed or strongly communitarian relations. 
Just as associationalism can combine both pluralism and mutualism in 
social relationships so it can combine, in political relations, democratic power 
with its accountability and restraint. Constituted by the participation of plural 
interests associational democracy can from its inclusiveness gain the strength 
and legitimacy it needs to tackle complex problems. Yet in this same feature 
power is also diffused and made broadly accountable to diverse interests in a 
way that puts restraints on its monopolization or abuse in any single set of 
hands. 
Association is quite different, then, from the alternatives. Association means 
the collection of the diverse. It is the organization, companionship and 
connection of the many, the loose aggregation of the several. Associative 
relations are based on partnership which is looser than common mutual 
identity yet more communal than competition. It describes the common 
purpose of the diverse. Think of the idea of business associates, for instance, or 
of the professional association. Such a conception applies both to the idea of 
the voluntary association as an organization and to the idea of associative 
relations between such associations in corporatist political forums. 
There is no several in the state communitarian model. Here community is 
the collective without the plural. It is singular and involves the top-down 
imposition of a false unitary will, the oneness of the many. Strong community 
is not diversity and commonality, but the conflation of the diverse into the 
common. 
The statist dimension of this strong communitarian model goes further. It 
delivers the common will from above. It disenfranchises interests from 
deciding together what their interests could be and how a settlement could be 
reached amongst them all. The state can somehow express, represent and 
execute externally and from above plural needs as one unified will. Statism 
adds the vertical coercion of hierarchy to the horizontal coercion of monist 
communality. It can be seen here how associationalism stands by the co-
operative values of socialism. but within a pluralist framework which rejects 
the statist and over-collectivist way in which those values have been pursued 
in historical instances of socialist practice. 
Yet there is no communality at all in competition. The market involves the 
striving of the many and diverse for advantage over one another. It gives 
people their individuality but at the expense of their sociality and solidarism. 
The competitive market model is pluralism without social responsibility, 
individualism without society. 
Against strong communitarianism, association permits pluralism; against 
statism it is for democracy through the association of interests themselves; 
against the market it is for diversity in a co-operative context. 
 
I do not propose associational democracy as an alternative to citizenship 
socialism. I propose it as a means towards its achievement. In my opinion 
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general advocacies of active citizenship and a common will are suggestive of 
something worth pursuing. What is needed is an idea of the political 
institutions which could facilitate participation and an agreed social good. 
Otherwise citizenship democracy remains an idea which seems to imply 
whole national populations crammed into their national parliaments 
'participating' in the running of the country on every matter conceivable. 
Associations can give citizenship socialists the concrete institutions they need 
to facilitate popular participation and the influence on, or even direct 
constitutive role in, government of popular interests. 
The fact that organized interest groups are so often particularistic and self-
interested cannot be a basis for rejecting an associationalist approach. Such 
undesirable manifestations can be overcome by the integration of associations 
into structures of pluralist social negotiation through which they can maintain 
and represent their own distinctive identities but must negotiate with other 
interests showing due regard for their respective needs and demands. This 
falls into neither the monism of the common will, nor the atomistic 
instrumentalism of liberal individualist and competitive pluralist approaches. 
It allows for a participatory democracy, sensitive to pluralism and capable of 
mutuality, amenable to some sort of common good but one socially negotiated 
and sensitive to difference rather than spuriously objective, uniform and 
imposed. 
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